Here you can view my research statement (ctrl + click for a new tab).
You can also view my cv for a short dissertation abstract on page 1, and for an extended abstract on page 6 (ctrl + click for a new tab).
Terence Cuneo (2007) has argued that we have to be committed to the existence of epistemic facts insofar as they are indispensable to theorizing (a project that is likewise cognitively indispensable). Furthermore, he argues that the epistemic properties of these facts are inextricably ‘ontologically entangled’ with certain moral properties, such that there exist indispensable ‘moral-epistemic’ facts. Cuneo, therefore, concludes that insofar as epistemic realism is true, moral realism is likewise true. I argue that Cuneo’s appeal to the existence of indispensable moral-epistemic facts is problematic, even granting the existence of indispensable epistemic facts. I conclude, therefore, that Cuneo’s argument fails to justify moral realism.
Constitutivist and Rational-Fundamentalist Self-Knowledge
Constitutivists argue that first-personal self-knowledge of one’s mental states is not a cognitive/epistemic achievement and is, instead, a metaphysical fact about rational mentality. This could mean that (1) one’s self-beliefs have their first-order objects as a proper part, (2) one’s self-beliefs just are self-conscious first-order mental states, or (3) one’s self-beliefs necessarily supervene on their first-order objects, despite enjoying a sort of ontological independence (say, because they are independently realized in the brain). Matthew Parrott (2017) has recently argued, however, that no account of self-knowledge which hopes to explain the possibility of self-ignorance should accept any of these constitutivist claims. Instead, he argues for what I call ‘rational fundamentalism’: the view that first-personal self-knowledge is brought about by the triggering of a fundamental disposition, enjoyed by rational agents who possess the requisite concepts, to form second-order beliefs about their first-order attitudes. Since this disposition–like other dispositions–can be masked, the connections it generates between the relevant attitudes are not necessary connections. The implication is that rational fundamentalism better explains self-ignorance. I deny this: constitutivism and rational fundamentalism, I argue, are equally theoretically virtuous on this front, while constitutivism is less objectionable than rational fundamentalism on two further fronts.
Most of my works in progress are not listed here, as four papers are currently under review and some are too early along to be mentioned here. Please contact me if you want to hear about my other works in progress.